The Case for Dynamic Key Distribution for PKI-Based VANETs by Salem, Ahmed H. et al.
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.6, No.1, January 2014 
DOI : 10.5121/ijcnc.2014.6105                                                                                                                      61 
 
THE CASE FOR DYNAMIC KEY DISTRIBUTION FOR  
PKI-BASED VANETS 
 
Ahmed H. Salem1, Ayman Abdel-Hamid2, and Mohamad Abou El-Nasr3 
 
1Computer Science Department, Old Dominion University, Norfolk, VA, USA 
2College of Computing and Information Technology, Arab Academy for Science, 
Technology and Maritime Transport, Alexandria, Egypt 
3College of Engineering and Technology, Arab Academy for Science, Technology and 
Maritime Transport, Alexandria, Egypt 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
Vehicular Ad hoc Networks (VANETs) are becoming a reality where secure communication is a 
prerequisite. Public key infrastructure (PKI) can be used to secure VANETs where an onboard tamper 
proof device (TPD) stores a number of encryption keys which are renewed upon visiting a certificate 
authority (CA). We previously proposed a dynamic key distribution protocol for PKI-based VANETs [1] to 
reduce the role of the TPD. A vehicle dynamically requests a key from its nearest road side unit. This 
request is propagated through network infrastructure to reach a CA cloud and a key is securely returned. A 
proposed key revocation mechanism reduced the number of messages needed for revocation through 
Certificate Revocation List (CRL) distribution. In this paper, performance evaluation and security of the 
proposed dynamic key distribution is investigated analytically and through network simulation. 
Furthermore, extensive analysis is performed to demonstrate how the proposed protocol can dynamically 
support efficient and cost-reduced key distribution. Analysis and performance evaluation results clearly 
make the case for dynamic key distribution for PKI-based VANETS. 
 
KEYWORDS 
 
VANET, Dynamic Key Distribution, PKI, TPD  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Vehicular Ad-Hoc Networks (VANETs) are a very promising evolution of Mobile Ad-Hoc 
Networks (MANETs) because of its capability in solving road problems such as traffic congestion 
and vehicular safety. A VANET consists of network entities, including On board units (OBU), 
Road side units (RSU), and a Certificate Authority (CA). These entities form a network hierarchy 
as illustrated in Fig. 1. Either a car manufacturer or government authority plays the role of the CA 
responsible for key generation and distribution. The RSUs are responsible for moderating 
communication between vehicles, and delivering messages from the CA. The RSUs are installed 
in standalone towers and organized according to the network topology. The OBUs are loaded in 
vehicles and are responsible for receiving and validating messages [2]. 
 
Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), and Infrastructure-to-Infrastructure 
(I2I) are vehicular communication modes as shown in Fig. 2. V2I allows vehicles to communicate 
with roadside units, while V2V allows vehicles to communicate with each other. I2I allows 
roadside units to communicate with each other [2].  
 
For security key storage, a VANET depends on a Tamper Proof Device (TPD) as the main storage 
for security communication elements [2]. Vehicles, while making their periodical visits to the CA, 
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2. RELATED WORK 
 
VANETs can be used as an infrastructure for many applications. These applications can be 
classified into four classes as follows [2]. General Information Services: includes mobile Internet 
and advertising; Information Services: for vehicle safety which includes warning messages, road 
awareness, and condition alerts; Individual motion control: using inter-vehicle communication, 
which includes collision avoidance, and cruise control; and Group motion control: using inter-
vehicle communication that includes optimized path planning, and rights based traffic control. 
 
The attacks against VANETs can be classified as follows [3]. Bogus information: attackers flood 
the network with incorrect information to affect other driver’s behavior; Cheating with 
positioning information: where attackers change their position, speed, and direction to escape 
from liability; ID disclosure: to track the location of vehicles; and Denial of Service: to bring 
down the network or cause an accident; and Masquerade: where an attacker pretends to be 
another vehicle using fake identities. 
 
Efficiently dealing with the key distribution problem is a cornerstone in the design of security 
algorithms. In previous research efforts, an authority is responsible for key issuance whether a 
vehicle maintenance center or a license renewal center. Any of these authorities can generate keys 
and save them in a Hardware Security Module (HSM) [6] or TPD [11]. The information stored on 
the TPD should not be accessible to anyone but trusted authorities. This device is considered the 
main component of the key management solution. 
 
Hubaux et al. [5,6] used the TPD as a storage medium for the public key of the certificate 
authority. In this approach, a node sends to another the hash of the global key. If it is the same as 
the hash generated from the key stored in the TPD, the communication is established between 
these two nodes. This approach relies on the TPD, which is expensive, and non-reliable device. 
 
Aslam and Zou [13] tried to ignore the TPD as a non-realistic device and used an on-board device 
loaded with prepaid cards containing the keys. The cards contain an identification and certificate. 
During initialization, the user information will be maintained with the provider and not stored in 
the device. When a user enters a service area, he makes the service payment using the on-board 
payment device. The message is encrypted by the provider’s public key, thus hiding the device 
certificate and services requested from eavesdroppers. The user is issued a pseudonym that will be 
valid for a given period/area. This is nearly the behavior using TPD. 
 
Zhang [14] assumed that a vehicle registers itself with a public/private key generator. When it 
enters the communication area of an RSU, it initiates a mutual authentication process with the 
RSU. Diffie-Hellman algorithm is used to exchange a symmetric key. RSU and other vehicles in 
range receive an encrypted message and a message authentication code (MAC). The MAC is 
generated based on the message and symmetric key shared with the RSU. Only the RSU can 
validate that the MAC as it is the only other owner of the symmetric key. If the RSU validates the 
MAC, it sends a valid message to the vehicles. To avoid the case of RSU failure, V2V 
communication will be performed instead ignoring V2I. PKI is used and a TPD is used for key 
storage. This approach ensures privacy but with no communication to the certificate authority to 
ensure the vehicle is legitimate. In addition, it treats each RSU as a separate network with no 
supposed mean of communication and cooperation. This will make the vehicle repeat this 
authentication process every time it enters the communication range of an RSU. 
 
Wasef and Shen [15] introduced a certificated distribution protocol for VANETs. They used a four 
level architecture consisting of Master CA (MA), CA, RSU, and OBU. The difference from the 
classical VANET in Fig. 1 is adding the MA that is the highest level of system security and trust. 
The authors use standard PKI and certificate revocation list (CRL) broadcasting between all 
levels [16]. They use two CRLs for RSUs and OBUs respectively and GPS to locate vehicles. 
This will flood the network with useless information. 
 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.6, No.1, January 2014 
64 
Hao et al. [17] introduced a distributed key management reducing the computation overhead. The 
authors used group communication between vehicles. The vehicle is supposed to periodically 
resend its location to the RSU. This will lead to problems concerning group leader and vehicles 
joining and leaving the group.  
 
Laberteaux et al. [18] introduced a secure CRL distribution protocol depending on V2V 
communication which results in 99% network coverage when compared to 91% achieved by V2I 
CRL distribution. Although this work achieves a very high percentage in CRL distribution it 
affects network utilization by using such network flooding protocol.  
 
One of the principles of the public key infrastructure (PKI) that should be handled effectively is 
key revocation, and how to distribute a certificate revocation list (CRL) among the VANETs 
efficiently without loading the network. Use of a CRL has many problems concerning VANETs. 
The CRL will be very long due to large number of vehicles. Short life time certificates will also 
create a vulnerability window. The infrastructure might not support a CRL especially at the start 
of deployment. 
 
Hubaux et al. [5, 6] introduced three solutions for CRL distribution problems. The Revocation 
Protocol of the Tamper Proof Device (RTPD), Revocation Protocol using Compressed CRL 
(RCCRL), and Distributed Revocation Protocol (DRP).  In RTDP, the CA sends an encrypted 
message to a vehicle to erase all keys in the TPD. The CA should know the vehicle location or the 
most recent one from a location database. The CA should receive an ACK from the vehicle. If no 
ACK is received, the CA sends the message via FM Radio or satellite. In RCCRL, Bloom filters 
are used to reduce the CRL size to be few kilobytes then broadcast them. In DRP, the vehicles 
accumulate accusations against misbehaving vehicles and then are reported to the CA. 
 
Aslam and Zou [13] introduced some precautions regarding revocation. First, the CA checks for 
revoked vehicles keys before key issuance to check that the user didn't revoke the vehicle's key. 
Second, CRL distributed within the RSU range. Third, Key provider companies can limit their 
work in specific geographical areas. 
 
Papadimitratos et al. [6] proposed a revocation protocol that divides the CRL into M equal pieces. 
The M pieces are encoded using erasure encoding into N redundant pieces. Each piece has a 
header then signed by the CA's private key. The header contains CRL version, time stamp, 
sequence number, and CA's Id. The pieces are sent to the RSU for broadcasting. When a vehicle 
receives a piece, it verifies the time stamp then the signature. If valid, the vehicle verifies if it has 
the piece already stored or not. After having enough pieces, it decodes the CRL. In this algorithm, 
there are multiple drawbacks. First, the encoding used avoids missing some pieces during sending 
but will result in flooding the network with unneeded packets. In addition, broadcasting to the 
whole network will result in decreasing the network performance. 
 
Nowatkowski [20] proposed two protocols to optimize the CRL distribution overhead. The first is 
Most Pieces Broadcast (MPB). MPB selects the node with maximum CRL pieces to broadcast. 
The second protocol is Generation Per Channel (GPC). GPC splits the CRL into multiple parts. 
Each one is sent on a different channel. The OBU downloads CRL pieces from every channel 
with equal probability. This results in the download completion for all pieces approximately at the 
same time. These protocols overload the network in addition to the difficulty of allocating 
multiple channels required by GPC. 
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3. DYNAMIC KEY DISTRIBUTION 
 
This section explains the proposed network model, the assumptions on which the protocol is built, 
how the key distribution works, how to deal with vehicle’s movement, how revocation is handled, 
resistance to security attacks, and how the proposed protocol compares to related work. 
 
3.1 Network Model 
 
The proposed solution introduces an RSU manager to the standard VANET hierarchy as 
illustrated in Fig. 3. The RSU manager stores the RSU locations and forwards CA messages to a 
specific RSU. The RSU manager is assumed to have all information regarding the RSUs under its 
authority. The RSU manager is responsible for keeping track of the current RSUs that requested 
keys for each vehicle until that key expires. A group of RSUs and their areas of responsibility 
form an administrative domain. This domain represents a suitable geographical division as 
dictated by civic authorities. To generalize, a CA cloud is assumed to be deployed. Augmenting 
the CA to become a CA cloud will make the RSU manager free to communicate with such cloud 
without having any limitation of a down server or unauthorized region. This could be achieved for 
example by assigning an anycast address to the CA cloud. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Proposed VANET Hierarchy 
3.2 Assumptions 
 
The following assumptions are in effect for the proposed protocol: 
 
1- Vehicles are free to communicate with each other after authentication. 
2- RSUs have a storage medium to store state about the vehicles passing by them as long as their 
certificate lifetime did not expire. 
3- RSU manager is responsible for a group of RSUs to cover the whole network as shown in Fig. 
3.  
4- RSU manager is responsible for locating RSUs and secure messaging between vehicles in their 
area of responsibility.  
5- Soft handover is supported between adjacent RSUs to ensure message passing while the 
vehicle moves on. 
6- Vehicles have a unique authentication key called vehicle authentication code (VAC) which is 
composed of the chassis number and electronic license plate (ELP) and is known only by the 
vehicle and the CA. 
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(1) Vehicle  RSU: ELP || N1
 
(2) RSU  RSUM: ERSUM-KU( ERSU-KR(ELP || N1 || N2 ) ) 
(3) RSUM  CA: ECA-KU( ERSUM-KR(ELP || N1 || N2 || N3) ) 
(4) CA  RSUM: ERSUM-KU (ECA-KR(EVAC( key || f(N1)) || N2 || N3))  
(5) RSUM  RSU: ERSU-KU (ERSUM-KR (EVAC( key || f(N1)) || N2 )) 
(6) RSU  Vehicle: EVAC( key || f(N1)) 
 
RSUM: RSU manager  KR: Private Key f: Agreed upon function 
KU: Public Key   N1, N2, N3: nonces  
 
Figure 4. Messaging sequence to acquire a key 
 
3.3 Key Distribution Workflow  
 
Fig. 4 depicts the proposed protocol workflow. The OBU sends a request to the RSU to acquire 
network authentication. The authentication scenario will be as follows. A vehicle requesting 
authentication sends its ELP with a nonce N1 to the nearest RSU. The RSU will append its nonce 
and double encrypts the ELP and nonces N1 and N2 with the RSU’s private key and RSU 
manager’s public key, respectively then sends to the RSU manger. The RSU manager checks the 
authenticity and integrity of the received message. If the message checks out, the RSU manger 
appends its nonce N3 then double encrypts the ELP and nonces N1, N2, and N3 with the 
manager’s private key and the CA’s public key, respectively then passes it to the CA. The CA 
checks the authenticity and integrity of the received message. If the message checks out, the CA 
checks if the vehicle is black-listed or has a previous revocation request. The CA generates the key 
and encrypts the (key and N1) with the VAC and appends to it nonces N2 and N3 and sends it to 
the RSU manager which in turns checks the message. If the message checks out, it passes it to the 
RSU after removing its nonce. The RSU unicasts the encrypted (key and N1) after removing its 
nonce N2. The only vehicle that can decrypt the message is the one requesting authentication. 
Messages [2-5] offer authentication and confidentiality services to recipients. In future work, 
techniques to make the VAC more challenging to attackers will be investigated. For simplicity, we 
refer to a distributed key in Fig. 4, where in practice the distributed key material would be a PKI 
certificate [9]. 
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TABLE 1 
Notations and Description 
 
 
Description 
l certificate lifetime (sec) 
v vehicle's speed (km/h) 
d distance between two adjacent RSUs (m) 
r radius of the area where the vehicle is most probably in (m) 
N The number of RSUs in the whole network 
n The number of RSUs in the circular area with radius r 
m Max. no. of messages to revoke vehicle's key 
tE2E time between revocation initiation and the actual revocation (sec.) 
tp.CA Revocation message processing time at CA (sec.) 
tCA Revocation message travel time from CA to RSU Manger 
tp.man Revocation message processing time at RSU Manager (sec.) 
tman Revocation message travel time from RSU Mgr to stored RSU (sec.) 
tp.RSU Revocation message processing time at RSU (sec.) 
tRSU Revocation message travel time between two adjacent RSUs (sec.) 
p Percentage of RSUs used to send a message 
 
This can be used in applications such as advertising where the RSU manager can send the RSU 
suitable advertisements for that region to publish to passing vehicles, e.g., restaurants in that 
region. In addition, the authentication center can send warning messages to the RSU to publish to 
the whole VANET. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Sample Mobility Management Scenario 
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Figure 6. Certificate revocation workflow 
3.4 Mobility Management 
 
The movement of vehicles between RSUs will trigger sending messages to the RSU manager to 
track the RSUs that each vehicle encountered during the certificate validity time as shown in Fig. 
5. If a vehicle moved between two RSUs under different RSU managers, the target RSU is 
responsible for registering the vehicle with its manager. Given that the certificate did not expire, 
the new manager informs the previous manager that the vehicle is now under its authority. Hence, 
any revocation message for the vehicle should be passed to the new RSU manager. If the vehicle 
moved further within the same administrative domain, a chain of RSU Managers will be formed. 
However, as the number of the RSU managers within an administrative domain is probably low, 
the probability of having a long forwarding chain is low. However, this issue will be considered in 
future work by introducing a root manager as a layer above RSU managers to handle switching 
between RSU managers. The CA will keep track of RSU managers that requested keys as long as 
the keys are valid. The RSU manager will keep track of the RSUs and RSU managers that each 
vehicle visited to be used in revocation. 
 
3.5 Certificate Revocation  
 
The role of the revocation protocol is to send a message to erase the certificate from the vehicle, 
and to warn other vehicles from dealing with the revoked-key vehicle. In previous work, CRL 
distribution depended on broadcasting either for the whole CRL at once or dividing it into 
compressed parts then broadcasting them [4]. 
 
The proposed solution depends on benefiting of the knowledge from the key distribution phase. 
For example, if the CA receives a request to revoke a specific vehicle's key (one possible 
revocation scenario). It checks if its certificate lifetime has expired or not. If it is still valid, the 
CA sends a revocation message to the stored RSU Manager. The RSU Manager checks if the 
vehicle is still registered and sends to the corresponding RSU that requested a key for the vehicle. 
The RSU will send the revocation message to all the vehicles in its region to warn them from 
dealing with this vehicle as depicted in Fig. 6.  
 
Fig. 7 depicts the analytical parameters for revocation. The notations used throughout the paper 
are shown in Table 1. Depending on the vehicle’s mobility scenario; its maximum speed can be 
deduced. For example, on a highway, a vehicle might have a maximum speed of 120 km/h. 
Within a city, the vehicle cannot exceed a speed of 60 km/h. Aided with the lifetime of the 
certificate and the original location; the maximum horizontal distance the vehicle could have 
crossed can be calculated. Unknowing the direction where the vehicle moved in, a circular region 
with radius r of the horizontal distance is assumed as given by equation (1). 
 
                                (1) 
 
A vehicle moves in one direction at a time. Hence, from the circular area with radius r, the vehicle 
can only move a distance of r which limits the number of RSUs that the vehicle passes by to m as 
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given by equation (2) which is equivalent to the number of required messages to revoke the key 
of a specific vehicle. 
 
m = (r/d) +1                               (2) 
 
The percentage of nodes p used can be calculated using the number of RSUs used m and the total 
number of RSUs N as given by equation (3). 
 
p = (m/N) * 100                         (3) 
 
The time interval between the revocation initiation and the actual revocation will be the sum of 
the CA processing time, the time the message takes to travel between the CA and the RSU 
manager, the processing time at the RSU manager, the message travel time between the RSU 
manager and the RSU, the time taken for processing at the RSUs, and the travel time the message 
takes between the RSUs (Equation 4). 
 
  .   
    
  . 
   
    . 
                  (4) 
 
Equation 4 has some significant components that influence the result of the equation and others 
that are negligible. Processing times are mostly of negligible values that can even be ignored as 
machines’ processing capabilities are continuously on the rise.  
 
 
 
Figure 7. Revocation analytical parameters 
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3.6 Security Characteristics and Resistance to Attacks 
 
The proposed protocol’s design provides built-in countermeasures for potential security and data 
integrity threats. In this section, the proposed protocol’s security characteristics and resistance to 
attacks is qualitatively outlined. Potential attacks include man-in the- middle, Sybil, and replay 
attacks briefly summarized as follows. Man-in-the-middle attack: a security attack where an 
intruder captures messages exchanged between two parties. Then, he generates messages based 
on them pretending to be an authorized member of the communication [10]. Sybil attack: users 
pretend to be others by faking their IDs [10]. Replay attack: is a network attack where an entity 
sends a prerecorded message (previously captured) to receive a data or connection that he is not 
authorized to access. Furthermore, a secure system must provide some services such as non-
repudiation where a sender/receiver cannot possibly deny sending/receiving a specific message 
[10]. VANETs as most mobile systems are prone to a plenty of security threats. Raya and Hubaux 
[3], Wasef and Shen [4], and Du and Zhu [8] mentioned some requirements for a VANET to be 
secure. It should provide authentication, availability, non-repudiation, and being effective in real-
time systems. In the following subsections, resistance to security attacks is qualitatively 
highlighted using a scenario-based approach. As terminology, (I) will denote the intruder and (V) 
will denote the vehicle requesting a key. 
 
3.6.1 Non-repudiation and Masquerade 
 
The proposed protocol requires the vehicle to send its ELP and then receives the key encrypted 
using the VAC. Since the VAC is not known except for the vehicle and CA, this will eliminate the 
vulnerability against non-repudiation as per the following scenario:  
 
• Vehicle (V) is requesting a key. 
• No one can send the request on behalf of (V) as no entity other than (V) and the CA know the 
ELP (non-repudiation). 
• On the other hand, if (I) pretends to be the CA and sends a key to (V). (I) will not be able to use 
the key, as the VAC is required for message decryption (masquerade). 
 
3.6.2 Man-in the-Middle Attack 
 
The proposed protocol ensures that messaging between the networks nodes is confidential to the 
message intended receiver. This will eliminate the vulnerability to the Man-in-The-Middle attack 
as per the following scenario: 
 
• (V) will send a key request to RSU with the following message (ELP||N1). 
• RSU will forward the key request till it receives a key back as previously explained in Fig. 4. 
• (I) will capture the message EVAC(key || f(N1)) 
• (I) will not be able decrypt the message, as it does not have the VAC. 
•  If (I) tried to tamper the message before delivering it to (V), (V) will be able to discover the 
tampering as this will change the f(N1). 
 
The previous example can be generalized between any two VANET entities to be sure that the 
Man-in-the-middle-attack will not affect the dynamic key distribution protocol for VANETs. 
 
3.6.3 Sybil Attack 
 
Since every vehicle has a unique identity that cannot be tampered. Sybil attacks are counter-
measured in the proposed protocol as per the following scenario: 
 
• (I) will not be able to send a key request, as it requires knowing the ELP. 
• If under any case (I) knows (V)’s ELP, it will send a key request to the RSU. 
International Journal of Computer Networks & Communications (IJCNC) Vol.6, No.1, January 2014 
71 
• The message reply containing the key will be encrypted with the VAC. In this case, (I) will not 
be able to make use of the generated key. Only (V) can use it, as it is the only holder of the 
VAC other than the CA. 
 
 
3.6.4 Replay Attack 
 
Nonces are used within the protocol messages. A nonce is a random or non-repeating parameter 
value that is included in data exchanged by a protocol, usually for the purpose of guaranteeing 
liveness and thus detecting and protecting against replay attacks. A nonce can be a timestamp, a 
visit counter on a Web page, or a special marker intended to limit or prevent the unauthorized 
replay or reproduction of a file. The following scenario describes how the proposed protocol 
responds to a replay attack: 
 
• (V) will send a key request message concatenated with its nonce to the RSU. 
• (I) will intercept (V)’s message.  
• (I) will later resend the message to the RSU on behalf of (V). 
• (V) can only decrypt the reply message containing the key, as no one knows the VAC other than 
(V) and the CA. 
• When (V) decrypts the message, it will realize from the nonce that the message is an old 
message. 
• (V) will ignore the message and request another key. 
 
3.7 Maintained State Analysis 
 
The proposed protocol relies on maintenance of state in the system. This section outlines what 
state needs to maintained by each entity in the system.  
 
• OBU: each vehicle needs to maintain its ELP, and only the active key credentials instead of 
holding a large number of keys. 
• RSU: needs to maintain a list of all vehicles passed by, and their next RSU (forwarding chain, 
see section 3.4) during the certificate lifespan. 
• RSU-Manager: needs to maintain the information of RSUs under its authority, in addition to 
vehicles that acquired active certificates. Furthermore, it should keep a record of vehicles that 
moved between multiple RSU-managers to minimize delivery failure as possible.  
• CA: should keep track of the blacklisted vehicles to be considered during the key issuance 
phase. 
 
The proposed work decreased the required storage per vehicles to maintain a safer key storage 
process. On the other hand, the protocol increased the responsibility of RSUs and RSU managers 
who are considered secure infrastructure components to hold required information while their 
physical security is out of the scope of this paper.  
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TABLE 2 
Comparison versus Related Work 
 
Related Work Key Distribution Revocation 
Hubaux [5] TPD stored keys Global CRL Distribution 
Papadimitratos [6] TPD stored keys Divide CRL to multiple lists and send 
Aslam and Zou [13] TPD stored keys Geographical CRL Distribution 
Zhang [14] Dynamic Key Distribution CRL Distribution 
Wasef and Shen [15] Dynamic Key Distribution 2 CRLs (RSU, and OBU) 
Hao et al. [17] Group Key Distribution CRL Distribution 
Laberteux et al.[18] TPD stored keys V2V CRL Distribution 
Nowatkowski [20] TPD stored keys Split CRL and send on different channels 
Proposed Work Dynamic Key Distribution RSU scope CRL distribution 
 
 
 
3.8 Comparison versus Related Work 
 
Previous approaches could not benefit from dynamic key distribution either because they depend 
on the TPD for keys storage [5-6] or because only the revocation issue is considered without 
trying to gain benefit of the available information. The proposed PKI infrastructure depends 
mainly on the idea of dynamic key distribution in [17, 18]. The vehicle requests a key which is 
issued by the CA. For the CA to send the certificate to the requesting vehicle, the location should 
be known at the sending time (RSU Manager and RSU). The certificate carries a parameter 
stating its lifetime, which will be the target for revocation. The revocation message should be sent 
before the certificate expires or it will be useless. Knowing the location of the vehicle at the time 
of requesting the key and the maximum speed limit for vehicles, it will be easy to target a limited 
region with the revocation message. This will help in optimizing the network overhead. 
Qualitative comparison versus related work is highlighted in Table 2. On the other hand, the 
proposed protocol expects the availability of secure reliable network infrastructure.  
 
 
4. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION 
 
Performance of the proposed protocol is measured analytically and through network simulation 
using ns-2 [21]. Simulation is performed using a simplified version of the protocol with single 
encryption for each message offering confidentiality as a proof of concept. Encryption was 
carried out using OpenSSL package [22]. However, the encryption overhead consumed less than 
5% of the overall simulation time. For all simulation results, each experiment was repeated 10 
times and the average is reported to be within a 95% confidence interval [23].  
 
The foregoing analysis will consider vehicle mobility using two different mobility models as 
illustrated in Fig. 8. First, consider a vehicle moving inside a city with average speed limits and 
frequently changing directions. The Manhattan Grid Model or city model is used to represent this 
mobility scheme. Second, consider a vehicle moving on a highway, which most probably is in a 
fixed direction with high speed. The Random Way Point Model or Highway model is adopted for 
this mobility scheme. The mobility scheme trace files were generated using BonnMotion v1.4 
generator [24, 25]. BonnMotion is Java software, which creates and analyses mobility schemes. It 
was originally developed by the Communication Systems group at the University of Bonn, 
Germany, where it served as a tool for the investigation of mobile ad hoc network characteristics. 
The mobility schemes are exported for use in ns-2. 
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Fig. 9 illustrates setup for the simulation network. The RSU manager controls a group of RSUs 
that send messages to the passing vehicle according to the transmission range. When a vehicle 
moves from RSU-1 to RSU-2 and it receives messages at RSU-1. It will pass it to RSU-2 to be 
delivered to the vehicle as soft handover is assumed. The RSU manager’s setup has some 
communication parameters to adjust the antenna used to send messages to longer distances. 
 
The following three schemes were used during simulation for comparison. Broadcasting, 
Cooperative message authentication protocol (CMAP) [16], and Dynamic (proposed). The 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Network Simulation Setup 
 
 
Figure 8. Mobility Models 
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broadcasting scheme broadcasts the messages to all nodes (abbreviated hereafter as BRD). BRD 
uses N messages for revocation [2]. There will be no effort for key distribution as the vehicle 
carries its own keys. In CMAP, the vehicle sends its position periodically [16]. The dynamic 
scheme is the protocol under consideration (abbreviated hereafter as DYN). Performance 
evaluation experiments include the following. 
 
1. Effect of vehicle speed on number of revocation messages; 
2. Effect of traffic density on number of revocation messages; 
3. Effect of RSU manager control region on number of revocation messages; 
4. Effect of node-to-node delay on effective message delivery; 
5. Effect of traffic density on Packet delivery ratio; and 
6. Effect of RSU manager count on number of revocation messages. 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Number of messages to reach vehicles analytically [1] 
 
Figure 11. Effect of vehicle density on revocation                     Figure 12. Effect of area on revocation 
 
4.1. Effect of Vehicle Speed on Revocation Messages 
 
Fig. 10 analytically shows the effect of changing the vehicle’s speed and how this will affect the 
number of messages needed for revocation according to equations (1-3) in section 3.5. Manhattan 
Model assumes to have N=1000, v=80 km/h, d= 500 m, and l = 300 sec (5 min). Then r = 
6666.67 m, m ≈ 15 messages, and  = 1.5%. This means that we need to send 1.5 % of the 
messages sent in the broadcasting protocol as shown in Fig. 10.  
 
Highway Model assumes to have N = 1000, v= 300km/h (an extreme), d = 1500m, and l = 900 
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sec. (15min). Then r = 75000m, m = 51 messages, and  = 5.1 %. This means that we need to 
send 5.1 % of the messages sent in the broadcasting protocol as shown in Fig. 10.  
 
 
Figure 13. Messages for revocation analytically [1]            Figure 14. Effect of Node-to-Node delay 
 
4.2. Scalability 
 
For this experiment, the number of vehicles in a fixed area is increased to identify the number of 
messages needed for revocation. Fig. 11 illustrates the simulation results. For instance, with 30 
vehicles the number of messages is 1.6% for Manhattan and 26% for Highway models of the 
number of broadcasting messages. To generalize, as the number of vehicles increases, the number 
of messages required for dynamic revocation is reduced as compared to previous approaches in 
both analytical and network simulation results. 
 
4.3. Revocation Effort 
 
The revocation effort in previous protocols was sizable as they depended on broadcasting in a 
specific region [6]. In previous protocols, the revocation messages were sent to the whole network 
either in a compressed form, or using multiple network channels, or to the close geographical 
region [15]. We will assume the close geographical region to be the circular area with radius r. We 
can make use of our knowledge of the vehicle area of presence to decrease our intended receivers 
to the minimum. As shown in Table 1, to reach the vehicle only m messages are needed for DYN 
in comparison to n messages for broadcasting. Fig.13 shows, analytically, how the number of 
messages sent to revoke a vehicle’s key will differ between the dynamic and broadcasting 
protocols as the area increases. For simulation, the area was changed to investigate how this will 
affect the number of revocation messages. Fig. 12 shows the effect of increasing the area versus 
the number of messages required for revocation. Fig.12 shows no significant difference as the 
Highway model has a few OBUs and RSUs to make the difference between protocols. As the area 
increases, we can ensure that the number of messages required for dynamic revocation 
outperforms previous approaches through both analytical and network simulation results. 
 
4.4. Delay 
 
The node-to-node communication delay is a critical issue that has its effect on the whole network. 
As the delay increases the network performance dramatically decreases. In reference to Fig. 14, 
although the network performance decreases, DYN keeps its better performance compared to 
BRD. In both Manhattan and Highway models, as the delay between the nodes increases the 
number of messages passing through the network decreases in a way that gives the advantage to 
DYN against BRD. For example if the node-to-node delay is 300 msec, then Highway-DYN 
requires 84% of the revocation messages used by BRD. The DYN-Manhattan requires 40% of the 
revocation messages used by BRD for 300 msec delay. 
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Figure 15. Packet delivery ratio         Figure 16. Effect of Number of RSU Managers 
 
4.5. Packet Delivery Ratio 
 
Fig. 15 depicts the efficiency of packet delivery when comparing DYN to BRD. It is clear that 
DYN achieves a constant delivery ratio regardless the traffic density. BRD starts with a low 
delivery ratio as it is supposed to reach out all vehicles in the system. On the other hand, DYN 
targets a small subset of the vehicles that are concerned with the revocation message achieving a 
higher delivery rate. 
 
4.6. The effect of increasing the number of RSU Managers 
 
The proposed protocol depends on the RSU manager in locating the RSUs and vehicles under its 
authority and using the best routes to deliver messages to the intended receivers with minimal 
number of sent messages. Fig 16 depicts how changing the number of RSU managers will affect 
the number of messages sent for revocation. The experiment was run for 100 sec. over an area of 
4 km2 (2 km x 2 km). The RSUs are divided equally among RSU managers depending on their 
regional location. When only 1 RSU manager is used, the revocation messages will be 
broadcasted to all RSUs which is equivalent to BRD’s behavior. When using 2 RSU managers, 
the RSUs will be divided among both managers which will decrease the number of revocation 
messages although the vehicle did not cross the RSU manager administrative domain. If it crossed 
the domain, the messages will be passed to the RSUs controlled by the other manager as 
previously explained in section 3.4. This will decrease the number of sent revocation messages as 
the number of RSU manager’s increases. At 8 RSU managers, the number of sent revocation 
messages would begin to increase again. This behavior is a result of the multiple divisions of the 
administrative domains. Starting from 8 RSU managers, the administrative domains will contain a 
fewer numbers of RSUs which will increase the probability for a vehicle to cross the 
administrative domain increasing the number of messages sent for revocation. This behavior will 
give an indication that the increase in the number of RSU managers along with a chain of RSUs 
will not enhance the performance all the way. The number of RSU managers, which will result in 
a small number of sent revocation messages, will vary according to the network size and 
structure. 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
 
In this paper, a lightweight dynamic PKI-based key distribution protocol for VANETs was 
proposed and thoroughly evaluated through analytical analysis and network simulation. The 
protocol reduces the role of TPD from being the main carrier and protector of the keys into 
carrying a key till the end of its lifetime. Vehicles will securely acquire the keys dynamically upon 
request. After the key is securely received, vehicles can communicate with other vehicles using 
the acquired key till its lifetime ends or it is revoked. If a vehicle’s key was requested for 
revocation, the revocation message will be sent only to the vehicles that have a probability of 
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communication with the revoked vehicle. Previous research could have sent to vehicles that 
would never have a probability to communicate with the revoked vehicle which in turns misuses 
the network resources. The proposed protocol efficiently reduces the revocation overhead and 
improves network utilization when compared to related work. The CA is assumed to be cloud-
based but future work will consider cloud-based RSU managers as well. Furthermore, the current 
solution will be enhanced by eliminating the RSU manager chain and simulating the increase in 
the number of RSU managers to see how this will affect the number of revocation messages. 
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